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Recent Cases
tablished rules governing men's conduct, even though the applica-
tion of them frequently results in injustices, than it is that justice be
worked out in every case, according to its merits, to the sacrifice
of ordler and.certainty.
The justification, therefore, for this function of law is, that no
justice at afl would be possible without order.
RECENT CASES.
Alientation of Affectians-Actiom for Does Not Survive the Death
of the Party Injured or Injuring.
This is an action for the alienation of the affections of the wife
of Charles Gross, against James Ledford. The action was brought
by Gross, who died intestate before a trial or judgment, and the
only question presented is whether the action survives to his ad-
ministrator.
Section 10, Ky. Stats., is as follows: "No right for action for
personal injury or injury to real or personal estate shall cease or
die with the person injuring or injured, except actions for assault,
slander, criminal conversation and so much of the action for mali-
cious prosecution as is intended to recover for the personal injury;
but for any injury other than those excepted, an action may be
brought or revived by the personal representative, heir or devisee,
in the same manner as causes of action founded upon contract."
It was held that since at common law the action did not survive,
it being an action for an injury to the person, the only question was
whether such an action comes under one of the exceptions in see.
10, Ky. Stats.
As to the construction of this section, the court held that since
the action for the alienation of affections and for criminal conversa-
tion were of the same genus and the measure of damages to be re-
covered the same (tho the remedy and the facts upon which the
action is founded are not necessarily the same), hence the legislature
must have intefided that neither of the actions should survive the
death of one of the parties.
It was pointed out by the court that any different construction
would allow the adultery of the spouse to be introduced and aggra-
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vate the damages in an action for alienation of affections, thus de-
feating the obvious intention of the statute.
Gross' Admr. v. Ledford, 190 Ky. 526.
Search and Seizures-Evidence Obtained by an Unlawful
Search Incompetent-Property Seized in Unlawful Search Should Be
Returned to the Person from Whom It was Taken..
Youman was indicted uander a statute making it unlawful for
any person "to have in his possession spirituous, vinous or malt
liquors for the purpose of selling them." A warrant was issued
against him and officers were sent to serve it. They did not succeed
in arresting him, but while on the premises they made a search for
any liquor that might be found there, and found and carried away
several gallons of whiskey. No search warrant was held by any of
the officers.
The court held (1) that evidence obtained by an officer in mak-
ing an unlawful search is incompetent and objection to its intro-
duction should have been sustained; (2) when property is seized in
an unlawful search the court should order it restored to the person
from whom it was unlawfully taken.
Youman v. Commonwealth, 189 Ky. 152.
Note: There are two lines of cases maintaining opposite views
on this question. The above case follows the line of cases headed
by Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 58 Law Ed. 652. The dis-*
tinction in that case was placed on the fact that a motion was made
before the commencement of the trial that the property unlaw-
fully seized be returned, and held that a refusal of such motion was
a denial of defendant's constitutional rights.
Duty of Motorman on Street Car Toward the Driver of an
Automobile on the Street Car Track.
Plaintiff, Margaret Koob, was being driven in a truck along the
path of the street car tracks of defendant company in the city of
Louisville. In order to avoid the traffic the driver of the truck un-
dertook to turn off the track into an alley for the purpose of continu-
ing down another street. The truck was stopped still. A street car
going at the rate of 15 miles an hour struck it, hurling plaintiff into
the air and injuring her severely.
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The court refused to rule as requested by defendant that the
motorman on the street car had a right to presume that the drivet
would continue to drive the truck straight ahead unless he signalled
the contrary, and' ruled as follows, saying: "The case is one where
the truck carrying plaintiff was in a place of danger as long as it
remained on the track, and the duty to keep a lookout and to use
ordinary care to avoid colliding with the truck necessarily carried
with it the additional duty of anticipating that the truck might
leave the track at any public alley or cross street.
Louisville Railway Company v. Koob, 190 Ky. 283.
Rights of Remainderman Not In Esse at Time of Disposition of
tlw Estate.
In 1899 Mary L. Wayne died testate. By provision of her will
she left all her property, subject to payments of her debts and some
special devises, to Mary M. Wayne, the wife of her son, J. Z. Wayne,
for their natural lives, remainder to their children. It was further
provided that should J. Z. survive his wife the property was to go
to him for life with remainder to his children. Mary M. Wayne died
leaving her husband and two infant children. J. Z. Wayne was
named executor in the will of Mary LI. Wayne. In settling up the
estate he found it necessary to sell the land consisting of 108 acres.
A judgment of the court was had to this effect. The two children
were represented by a guardian ad litem. After the judgment and
sale in pursuance thereof plaintiff, the son of the second marriage
of J. Z. Wayne, was born. He now brings this action claiming a third
part of the land and prayed for a partition thereof.
Held, in the absence of fraud or collusion in obtaining the judg-
ment for the sale of the estate, and where all of the proceedings are
regular, the remaindermen in esse being properly represented, the
judgment authorizing a sale is not void to after-born remaindermen,
for the cieditors of a decedent can not be indefinitely postponed
in the collection of their debts because there may be in the future
additional remaindermen under the terms of a will, and in such an
action the remaindermen in existence will be considered as represent-
ing all remaindermen of the same class who may thereafter come
into existence, and such representative not then in esse is bound by
the judgment.
Wayne, by etc. v. Brumley, et al., 190 Ky. 488.
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Mines and AIinierals-Lease--Contracts--Abawdonnent.
Plaintiffs leased land to defendants for a period of five years, for
the purpose of drilling and operating for oil and gas thereon. If
lessee failed to begin a well within one year or to complete same
within 18 months from the date of the lease, it was to become null
and void, but that a forfeiture could be prevented by the lessee pay-
ing to the lessor one dollar per acre per year in advance for each year
the completion of a well was delayed. Lessee drilled 350 feet, then
moved the drilling machine off the land. Plaintiffs bring action to
have lease forfeited.
Question: Is this a completion of a well within- the meaning of
the lease ?
Held: No. To complete a well as contemplated in a lease to
drill for oil and gas within a fixed period of time means to drill a
well within the time through the strata and into the oil or gas bear-
ing formations unless oil or gas in paying quantities is sooner en-
countered. *Where, as in the present case, drilling on a well is
abandoned before the shale which overlies the oil bearing sands, is
penetrated and without finding oil or gas in paying quantities, the
well is not completed as contemplated by the lease.
Hunt v. Carvin, 190 Ky. 472.
Municipal Corporations-Taxation--Power to Tax.
The plaintiffs, who are citizens and taxpayers of the city of
Lexington, Ky., bring this action for themselves and on behalf of
all other citizens and taxpayers, for mandamus to compel defendants
to issue and sell $75,000.00 of city bonds, and to apply the proceeds
to the erection of a building in Lexington upon the grounds of the
University of Kentucky, as'a memorial to the citizens of Lexington
and Kentucky, who gave their lives in the world war. Lexington
is a city of the second class. The petition set out in detail the enact-
ment in strict accord with the prescribed procedure of ordinances,
declaring it to be a matter of public welfare and municipal concern
that the proposed memorial be erected, that it was submitted to the
voters of the city and passed by more than 2-3 majority.
Question: Did city have the power to appropriate funds or
incur an indebtedness for the purpose proposed?
Recent Cases
Held: The power to tax is a sovereign power, legislative in char-
acter. The legislature can delegate to municipalities the power to tax
for municipal purposes. Charters of cities of the second class do not
contain express or implied authority for such cities to issue bonds
for the erection of a memorial building for those citizens of the city
and State who lost their lives in the defense of the nation. This
building was not necessary to accomplish municipal purposes.
Barrow, et al. v. Bradley, Mayor, et al., 190 Ky. 480.
Pleading-JudiciaZ Notice.
The petition in this case avers that Anna McFeena lost her life
on July 9, 1919, through the negligence of the Paris Telephone and
Telegraph Co., and prays judgment against that corporation for
$15,000.00 damages.
A general demurrer was sustained by the trial court to the peti-
tion for the reason that the defendant was at the time of the accident
to, and death of Mrs. MeFeena, in the possession and under the di-
rection and control of the United States government through its
Postmaster General.
The petition made no mention of government control of defend-
ant, but contained only the usual and necessary averments of negli-
gence to constitute a cause of action in favor of the administrator
against defendant in the absence of government control.
Question: Should the lower court take judicial knowledge of
the joint resolution of Congress authorizing the President of the
United States to take over and operate all such companies?
To render a petition subject to demurrer ordinarily the defect
must appear upon the face of-the pleading. Exceptions to this rule
are matters of which the court will take judicial notice. Such facts
need not be stated in the pleading. A court will take judicial notice
of all facts affecting the public at large and which should be known
by the generality of the people of the State; this includes general
statutes passed by the legislature of our State, laws of nations, laws
of the United States, and proclamations of the President of the
United State.
Since the facts of which the court was required to take judicial
knowledge, when read into and considered a part of the petition
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rendered it bad by showing that the plaintiff had and could maintain
no action against defendant, the demurrer was properly sustained.
McFeena's Admr. v. Paris Home Telephone & Telegraph Co.,
190 Ky. 299.
Railroads-Actions for Injuries to Licensees.
Plaintiff alleged that defendant obstructed 12th street, a public
way in the city of Covington, for an unreasonable length of time,
and that in endeavoring to go around the train so blocking said
crossing, plaintiff stepped into a hole on the company's right of
way, and was thereby injured. This action was instituted to re-
cover damages for the injuries *so sustained.
Held: Generally speaking, a railroad company in the opera-
tion of its engines and cars owes to a licensee the duty of giving
warning of the approach of trains.
But the company is not required to safeguard every place of
possible danger on its right of way.
The licensee must take the property as he finds it, since the
owner is only liable to a licensee for injuries resulting from wilful
acts.
Rabe v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., et al., 190 Ky. 256.
Negligence-Benet to Invitor Essential.
Action to recover damages which plaintiff sustained by falling
on the floor in the residence of defendant. Plaintiff was there at
defendant's invitation. The floors were highly polished and oriental
rugs thereon. While walking thru the house plaintiff slipped on a
small rug about 4 feet square and injured her leg.
Held: Since plaintiff was invited as a guest she enters on no
better footing than if she were a bare licensee.
She cannot hold the owner or occupant to any duty of care or
diligence beyond giving notice of any danger of which he is aware.
The licensor must not set a trap or be guilty of active negligence
which contributed to the injury.
Greenfield v. Miller, 180 N. W. 834.
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Slander.
Defendant accused plaintiff, who is a minister of the gospel, of
being a whoremaster. Plaintiff brings action of slander against de-
fendant.
Held: It is a general rule that words tending to prejudice one in
his profession are only actionable per se, when spoken of him in his
professional capacity, but in the case of a minister of the gospel a
distinction is made and a charge of immorality against him is ac-
tionable per se without any colliquium referring to his calling. There
is no time when he is not engaged in the pursuit of his calling.
Hickerson v. Masters, 190 Ky. 168.
Embezzlement.
Defendant was convicted of embezzlement. He embezzled from a
corporation which he represented as agent. His defense was that
the corporation was not authorized to do business in this State.
Held: It is no defense to a charge of embezzlement that the
corporation obtained the property illegally, or could not own such
property under the statute. In such a case the rights of the Com-
monwealth are involved and the wrongful act of the principal can-
not be invoked as a protection against the still more wrongful act
of the guilty agent.
Sebree v. Commonwealth, 190 Ky. 164.
Deeds-Mental Capacity-Burden of Proof-Undue Influence.
A widow 74 years of age, crippled and afflicted with disease,
entered into a contract with her son while she was on the bed of
affliction, whereby he agreed to support her during the remainder
of her life in consideration of $800.00 cash in hand paid, and all of
the property of which she may die the owner.
Other heirs of intestate bring this action to have the contract
set aside.
Held: The law looks upon a case of this kind with suspicion. The
circumstances show undue influence was exercised by the son, and an
undue advantage contained by him which he failed to disprove by
clear and convincing evidence under the burden which the law casts
upon him under such circumstances.
Watson v. Watson, et al., 190 Ky. 270.

